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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 717 
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIBILITY OF TRANSPORTATION 
EXPENSES BETWEEN Two PLACES OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT-Petitioner was 
employed as a high school principal by the city of Attleboro, Massachusetts, 
where he lived. He was also employed as an accounting instructor by Boston 
University, thirty-seven miles distant, two evenings a week for thirty-two 
weeks during the taxable year. He used his personal automobile to travel 
between the two cities and did not remain overnight in Boston. Neither 
employer expressly required him to incur any transportation expenses in 
connection with his teaching duties and there was no arrangement for re-
imbursement of transportation costs. The Tax Court affirmed the Com-
missioner's disallowance-- of a deduction for the automobile expenses in-
curred in traveling between the two cities which petitioner had taken to 
arrive at his adjusted gross income before employing the standard deduc-
tion.1 On appeal, held, reversed. The Tax Court erred in its holding that 
the expenses were not incurred in connection with the performance of 
services by petitioner as an employee. Further, the taxpayer was "away 
from home" within the statutory meaning when he traveled to his evening 
teaching job. Chandler v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 467. 
Certain expenses incurred while traveling in connection with a tax-
payer's trade or business have long been deductible under our income tax 
laws.2 However, commuter's fares between home and business have been 
held not deductible because they are considered personal rather than busi-
ness expenses.3 The problem of categorizing expenses with characteristics 
placing them between these two extremes was solved under the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939 by the application of the criteria established in Com-
1 Douglas A. Chandler, 23 T.C. 653 (1955). I.R.C. (1939), §22 (n) (2) provided. for 
"deductions allowed by §23 which consist of expenses of travel, meals and lodging while 
away from home, paid or incurred by the taxpayer in connection with performance by 
him of services as an employee" in arriving at adjusted gross income. If the claimed 
transportation deduction had been aUowed in arriving at adjusted gross income, the tax-
payer could then have utilized the standard deduction in determining his net income. 
2 Section 23 (a) of the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939, 1938, 1936, 1934, 1932 and 
1928; section 214(a) of the Internal Revenue Codes of 1926, 1924, 1921. Earlier acts did 
not provide specificaJly for travel expense deductions. 
SCharles H. Sachs, 6 B.T.A. 68 (1927); John C. Bruton, 9 T.C. 882 (1947); Beatrice 
H. Albert, 15 T.C. 350 (1950). See 31 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 520 (1951). 
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missioner v. Flowers.4 The expense had to be (I) a reasonable and necessary 
traveling expense (this could include transportation fares, food, and lodg-
ing expenses), (2) incurred while away from home, and (3) incurred in the 
pursuit of the trade or business of the taxpayer or his employer. The Court 
indicated that the travel must be actually required by the employer to sat-
isfy this last requirement.5 If a traveling expense did not meet all three 
criteria, it was a commuter expense and not deductible under section 23 (a) 
(I) (A) of the 1939 code.6 The "away from home" test involved7 three 
int~rpretative problems. They are: (I) Must the taxpayer remain away 
from home overnight? (2) .H~w far away from home ~ust the taxpayer 
travel? (3) What is meant by the word "home"? The principal case properly 
recognizes that the taxpayer need not remain away from home ovemight8 
but that it is essential that the taxpayer leave the general metropolitan area 
of his home city.9 The word "home" has been equated to the taxpayer's 
actual residence by some courts10 and to his principal post of duty by 
others.11 Because both the taxpayer's residence and his principal post of 
duty were clearly in the same city, ·the court in the principal case was not 
forced to 'choose between the two interpretations.12 The principal case 
indicates that the Tax Court must have based its decision upon an appli-
cation of the third criterion, the "required by the employer" test of the 
Flowers case. The court of appeals agreed that if this test were applicable, 
th~ claimed deduction would fail since the travel was not specifically 
required by either of the employers in the principal case. To avoid the ap-
4. 326 U.S. 465, 66 S.Ct. 250 (1945). 
Ii Id. at 470-473. 
6 Ibid. Of course if the expense were not deductible under §23 it was not deductible 
under §22 (n) (2), which incorporated §23 by reference. See note 1 supra. 
· '1 Under the 1954 code it is no longer necessary that transportation expenses (as dis-
tinct from meals and lodging) be incurred while away from home in order to be deductible 
in co_mpµting adjusted gross income before utilizing the standard deduction. I.R.C. (1954), 
§62 (2)(c). . 
s Principal case at 470; Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949); Scott v. Kelm, (D.C. Minn. 
1953) 110 F. Supp. 819; Caroll B. Mershon, 17 T.C. 861 (1951); Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 
Cum: Bul. 303. The Tax Court in the principal case avoided the problems of the "away 
from home" criterion by resting its decision entirely on other grounds. 23 T.C. 653 at 655. 
9 Compare the principal case, at 470, with Amoroso v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1952) 
193 F. (2d) 583. See also Raymond E. Kershner, 14 T.C. 168 (1950); Summerour v. Allen, 
(D.C. Ga. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 318; Frank N. Smith, 21 T.C. 991 (1954). 
. 10 Wallace v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 407; Coburn v. Commissioner, 
(2d Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 763. See 19 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 534 (1952). 
11 Barnhill v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 913; Ney v. United States, 
(8th Cir. 1948). 171 F. (2d) 449. The Supreme Court refused to resolve this conflict in 
Commissioner v. Flowers, note 4 supra, preferring to rest its decision on its third criterion. 
12 However the court's position is unclear because it quotes dicta from Joseph H. 
Sherman, Jr., 16 T.C. 332 (1951), which refers to the taxpayer's "residence" as the crucial 
point. Principal case at 469. In the Sherman case the tax "home" was held to be at the 
business location where the taxpayer spent the most time and had his residence rather 
than the business location where he earned the most money. Rev. Rul. 55-604, Int. Rev. 
Bul. No. 40, p. 8 (1955), was quoted in the principal case to indicate that the Internal Rev-
enue Service's interpretation of the Sherman holding was another vote for the "principal 
duty location" definition. However, this revenue ruling is concerned with meals and 
lodging under §162 (a) (2) of the 1954 code and also contains a vehement disavowal of the 
Sherman dicta. 
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plication of this test, the court of appeals observed that the Flowers case in-
volved only one business location rather than two widely separated places 
of employment.18 However, the Commissioner had conceded throughout 
that the taxpayer's deduction would have been proper under section 23 (a) 
(1) (A) alone.14 The question which should then have been clearly an-
swered is whether the words of section 22 (n) (2) place a different and 
more stringent limitation upon the deductibility of travel expenses than the 
words of section 23 (a) (1) (A).15 It is possible that the Flowers "required by 
the employer" test is the same as the "in connection with the performance 
. . . of services as an employee" test of section 22 (n) (2). If they are the 
same, the court should have so stated and then supported its decision on 
the basis of the Commissioner's concession.16 If they are not the same, the 
interpretative problem has not been satisfactorily resolved by the principal 
case because there was no discussion of any cases or rulings which deal with 
the "as an employee" test of section 22 (n) (2)17 but only those which deal 
with section 23 (a) (I) (A). Since the words of section 22 (n) (2) are present 
in the 1954 code as section 62 (2) (B) the problem of what the section actual-
ly means is still moot. 
George E. Ewing, S. Ed. 
18 Principal case at 469. The court's reasoning was that it is impossible for the tax· 
payer to be in two locations simultaneously and since he is required to travel by exigencies 
he is within the statutory provision just as if he were specifically required to travel by 
an employer. 
14 Principal case at 468. 
15 On the function of §22 (n) (2) and its relation to §23 (a) (1) (A), see note 1 supra. 
16 Another approach to the taxpayer's problem in the principal case might have been 
to argue that a teacher is a professional person whose transportation would be deductible 
under §22 (n) (1), as a trade or business expense, in arriving at adjusted gross income. 
But see Chester C. Hand, Sr., 16 T.C. 1410 (1951) (teacher held to be an employee and 
not a professional man). 
17 The only case cited by the court which deals with §22 (n) (2) was Kenneth Waters, 
note 8 supra, which the court quoted to substantiate its observations on the "overnight" 
test. (See note 8 supra and adjacent text.) There was no attempt to compare it with 
the principal case on the "as-an-employee" test. 
